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Europe and the Maghreb: 
Its Impact and Importance in US Foreign Policy 
 
Astrid B. Boening
 
 
       … The expectations that accompany my presidency around the world … are … rooted in 
a  discontent  with  a  status  quo  that  has  allowed  us  to  be  increasingly  defined  by  our 
differences, and outpaced by our problems. But they are also rooted in hope – the hope that 
real change is possible, and the hope that America will be a leader in bringing about such 
change … when many around the world had come to view America with skepticism and 
distrust, part … due to misperceptions and misinformation about my country…part … due to 
opposition to specific policies,… and a belief that on certain critical issues, America has 
acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others… More than at any point in 
human history – the interest of nations and people are shared… (Obama speech to the UN 
General Assembly 24 September 2009). 
 
 
Abstract 
It is recognized transatlantically that the United States will not single-handedly shape a New World Order 
as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism appears to be developing in 
many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with aspiring potential regional hegemons, 
such as Turkey, Iran, possibly Syria, as well as an enhanced presence in the Mediterranean of Russian and 
Chinese  non-commercial  vessels.  This  rapidly  changing  greater  Euro-Mediterranean  region  has  the 
potential  for  a  more  democratic  paradigm  in  which  to  approach  new  and  old  security  threats  of 
neighboring countries – and yet perhaps a fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of 
its imminent weakening (British Council 2008). The role of the expected continued presence of the U.S. 
in the (greater) Mediterranean and Middle East, through NATO, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative, as well as a number of (ad hoc) peacekeeping missions (such as in and off the 
coast of Somalia) are analyzed from its bilateral  as well multilateral structural embeddedness in the Euro-
Mediterranean region. 
        Especially the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
1 would fit Van Langenhove‟s (2007) concept of a 
(hypothetical) “Third Regionalism”, whereby the institutional environment for dealing with „out of area‟ 
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 consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive in 
engaging  with  inter-regional  arrangements  and  agreements,  going  beyond  purely  trade  issues  with  a 
multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. The 
UfM‟s potential in contributing to regional security and stability (i.a. as nested in the EU‟s permanent 
delegation to the UN beyond its goal in terms of political, economic and social-cultural development), has 
the potential to consolidate competing preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history 
and cultural and institutional structures existing today in the Euro-Mediterranean “region”.  
                This chapter will extrapolate the security implications of this region in terms of the revision, 
which  previous  research  suggested  (e.g.  Boening  2008;  2009),  to  a  Euro-Mediterranean  Regional 
Security Complex (in light of the complexity of the internal securitization processes and the degree of 
security  interdependence  in  the  region)  from  the  Middle  Eastern  Regional  Security  Complex,  which 
Buzan and Waever‟s (2003) had proposed.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The transatlantic relationship, whether between the U.S. and the EU, or with NATO as the hard security 
common platform, is complex, rich, and far from a fait accomplit. As global threats evolve and emerge, 
this strategic alliance continues robust in their light. 
      It is in the Mediterranean that they meet, a sea of enriching trades, desperation and newcomers to seek 
benefit.  Multilateral  strategic  inter-regionalism,  such  as  the  “north-eastern  inter-regionalism”,  e.g. 
“Mediterranean-Black Sea,” have strategically and economically played a significant role over centuries 
(compare Sanfelice 2009c, 2), whether for the Ottomans vis-á-vis the Silk Road, or for the recent growth 
in Russian trade in coal, oil or manganese (Ibid.) – or illegal trafficking - making the Black Sea the Asia-
connection to the Balkans and the Mediterranean an international sea trade routes (Ibid.).  
    As “outsiders” (to the Mediterranean), such as China‟s oil companies (seeking ever larger foreign 
deals) proliferate in the trans-regional areas of the Euro-Mediterranean, state interests continue to extend 
to the inter-regional dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean (such as into Iran and Kazakhstan (Hoyos 2009) 
as well as to the Middle East and Africa as some of the most prolific traders, investors, and immigrant 
population,  their  oil  shipments  from  the  Middle  East  protected  to  a  large  extent  by  NATO  naval 
operations in the Persian Gulf.   
     The December 1994 Essen European Council summit declared the Mediterranean region an area of 
strategic importance for the EU (Schumacher 2009, 183), where geography still matters in an era of 
globalization (Biscop 2009, 25): While there was agreement about the reciprocal economic, political and 
social significance between the countries bordering the Mediterranean, there was no EU membership 
perspective for the Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU has been developing a regional strategy 
involving the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries as well as the South-South Mediterranean 
linkages, i.a.  through the EMP and now the UfM, overlapping with NATO‟s Mediterranean Dialogue and 
Istanbul Initiative: At present, with the end of the U.S.‟ combat mission in Iraq (and the strength this 
provides Iran with the new role of Iraqi Shiites), Turkey‟s foreign policy and trade re-orientation, Syria‟s 
possible external re-alliance, Russia‟s role in the Near-East‟s balance of power, and, last but not least, the 
re-opening of direct talks between the Mideast Quartet and Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Hence 
both  the  EU‟s  and  the  U.S.‟  interests  towards  the  Mediterranean  are,  beyond  the  economic,  from  a 
security perspective, i.e. to main regional stability, utilizing hard and soft power. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
    
1 The restructuring of the UfM (as an “upgrade” from the EuroMed Partmership) addresses many of the qualms practitioners 
and academics had vis-à-vis the EuroMed Partnership (“Barcelona Process”), such as through the diffusion and transfer processes 
both from the UfM into the EU and/or those from inside the EU out to non-EU UfM member states (i.e. those on the Southern 
shore of the Mediterranean) in addressing the Euro-Mediterranean region‟s  opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses in 
meeting its diverse and complex mandates. 
      As the U.S. has indicated several shifts in its foreign policy under the Obama presidency, in particular 
with respect to the inter-regional dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean, so the EU can be expected to 
assert its foreign policy more focused (i.e. supranational) since the passing of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
appointments  of  Herman  van  Rompuy  as  permanent  president,  and  Catherine  Ashton  as  High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy. 
        
The Transatlantic Link: Nationalism, Realism, and Shared Interests – Convergence 
in “Globalized” Regional Security 
 
Since World War II the transatlantic relationship has involved extensive political, economic and social-
cultural cooperation. Security challenges in a globalized world require increasingly not national solutions 
alone, but multilateral approaches, as the transatlantic approaches exemplify, such as the new transatlantic 
Energy Council which represents a new forum for cooperation in the field of energy (EurActiv 2009), and 
a step in achieving limitations in global warming. Neither the European nor U.S. security dilemmas are 
solved  through  a  simple  binary  choice  between  coercion  and  engagement  (Stephens  2009c),  but  are 
increasingly  embedded in the formulation  of  new  global  orders,  its  leadership  continuing  to  be  to a 
considerable extent the U.S., but likely with a strong influence from emerging powers and continued 
solidarity with the EU. 
    Chua (2009), quoting George Friedman of Stratfor, argues that the U.S., because it controls both the 
Pacific and the Atlantic, has actually just started its ascent, rather than its decline. However, the age of 
American Exceptionalism of the past may yield to an era of greater multilateralism: far from the end of 
history, international peace, stability and prosperity are far from guaranteed (compare Kagan 2008)
2. 
     While some authors (e.g. Ellis 2009, 361) advocate a U.S. Grand Strategy now,  based not on formal 
international organizations “because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with 
its European allies” (Ibid.), I would take exception to that. Rather, U.S. transatlantic Grand Strategy 
following the G.W. Bush presidency will not only reduce the focus on the War on Terror, but appears to 
give way to a greatly evolving (broadening) strategic environment, involving more flexible coalitions to 
accommodate  domestic  and  international  policy  restraints,  as  well  as  operating  stronger  within 
international law (some authors viewing this as based on ”Western liberal international law” (Ellis 2009, 
361)) to enable more nuanced responses to proliferating threat types and the actors promulgating them. 
The emerging new global world order, and the transatlantic relationship in particular, will not be able to 
limit  themselves  to  bilateral  agreements,  but  will  need  to  incorporate  a  much  more  “democratic” 
representation of state- as well as non-state actors in achieving these goals. 
       This transatlantic  multilateralism exists not only between European countries and the U.S., or the 
U.S. and the EU, but involves non-state actors and transnational actors such as MNCs, as well as their 
products and services investments, competition, transparency of public-procurement markets and trade 
facilitation and trade liberalization, with an eye towards the threats to the transatlantic community that can 
arise from legitimate actors, not to mention illegitimate ones, all potentially weakening the power of the 
state, as simultaneously new structures will evolve. In terms of the EU this is the case most currently with 
the UfM, “which configured a multi-layered „Barcelona Process‟ in which the UfM is working side by 
side with the Neighborhood Policy and the array of Commission‟s policies towards the Mediterranean… 
to [effectively] replace the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (Xenakis and Tsakonas 2010, 32), hereby 
reducing the centrality of the EU in favor of the role of all memberstates‟ governments and NGOs. Since 
the UfM, like its predecessor, the EMP, is an integral part of the ENP, with the majority of its substantial 
funding continuing to derive from the EU for the time being, the role of individual states region-wide is 
more likely shared with the EU‟s role in the region, especially in conjunction with the common External 
                                                            
    
2 with the primacy of the U.S. economy projected to be relinquished to China in 2032 (Dadush and Stancil 2009, 3)  – though 
the U.S. challenged defeatist prognosis, such as Paul Kennedy (“The Rise and Fall of Great Powers”) that “the only answer to the 
question increasingly debated by the public of whether the United States can preserve its existing position is „no‟” (Plender 
2009). 
 Action Service fully operational by the end of 2010 in support of  the EU‟s external goals, outlined e.g. by 
Jose Barroso in his State of the Union 2010-address recently in terms of the EU‟s external presence 
increasingly pulling its weight on the global stag, and building an area of freedom, justice and security 
(Barroso 2010,1). 
    The U.S.‟ links to the (greater inter-regional) Mediterranean region, besides economic (such as through 
its free trade agreement with Morocco) and political, involve both hard and soft security through NATO 
and its regional dialogues (i.e. the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), and 
their reciprocal institutional linkages. Progressing from the U.S.‟ unipolar moment globally in the 1990s 
into the beginning of the 21
st century, to the speculated “G-2” new global power balance, it is time to 
assess which role the U.S. and the EU will play in the (greater) Mediterranean: will the EU continue to be 
more of a payor rather than a player? Is this advisable to further the EU‟s as well as its memberstates‟ 
economic and political interest for stability in this region, or should it be a more influential player as other 
emerging and revisionist powers, be it Russia, Turkey, China, Syria or Iran, flex their maritime, nuclear, 
economic and/or political muscle, marginalizing the EU in future global power constellations, comparable 
perhaps with Japan today (Stephens 2010)?  
      As the U.S. has concluded its combat mission in Iraq, not only opening economic opportunities for the 
EU there in Iraq‟s reconstruction, this has also affected the greater regional power balance, especially 
involving emerging regional hegemons in the greater Middle East and Mediterranean, such as Iran and 
Turkey. These will be detailed below.  
     Furthermore, the October 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon will showcase the new NATO 2020 Strategic 
Concept to address new dangers under the complex demands of many-sided operations in an era of 
response capability needs which are versatile, yet under tight resources, in order to support its principle 
for democracy against totalitarian ideologies, in a more stable long term political environment now.  
    At the time of writing, the Mediterranean region is particularly salient to both the EU and the U.S., e.g. 
the renewed Palestinian-Israeli peace dialogue in conjunction with the Mideast Quartet, developing the 
relationships with Turkey and Syria in terms of their evolving foreign policies, and addressing common 
threats, such as Iranian weapons grade uranium enrichment.      
     Shared interests in transatlantic foreign policy are hence specifically i.a. the Arab-Israeli peace talks, 
START negotiations (and the positioning of any concurrent missile defense), future article 5 and non-
Article 5 missions by NATO within NATO‟s new “2020 Strategic Concept”, and the global governance 
of the evolving space policy.  
 
Security 
 
Previous findings (e.g. Boening 2008) indicate the greater Mediterranean region resembling a regional 
security complex, taking into account security levels and sectors as well as other criteria from Regional 
Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Waever 2003). Hence all soft and hard power aspects of political, 
economic  and  social-cultural  “co-existence” in  the greater  Euro-Mediterranean  region,  in  addition  to 
classical military security, continue to be at play in the greater Euro-Mediterranean, and will likely need 
to be strengthened in light of the assertion of emerging potential regional hegemons to the east and south:    
       In  the  southern  Mediterranean,  NATO‟s  projected  role  for  the  future
3  as  a  bridge  between  the 
European and the North American member states continues to be strong, if more subtle within non-Article 
5 missions as compared to only Article 5 missions. It is well positioned vis-á-vis the ESDP and EU 
softpower initiatives for crisis management, much more able to integrate Madeline Albright‟s  “3 Ds-
directive”  (of  “no  duplication  of  efforts,  no  discrimination  towards  any  member  countries,  and  no 
decoupling of member states) between it and the ESDP. Modern state security requires hardware as well 
as pro-active skills to face modern threats, such  as in cyber security, missile defense, sea and airlift 
capacity. Some NATO‟s work for the coming decades is within a newly formalized (as of September 
2008) relationship with UN positions within “a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation” 
(Hamilton et al. 2009, 39), e.g.”to safeguard Kosovo‟s fragile stability … (or for the protection) of UN 
food aid shipments to Somalia against the threat of pirate attacks” (Ibid.).    
         As U.S. military power is viewed to be often more “persuasive” with its partners especially in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East than European soft power initiatives, the former backed by U.S. 
willingness for trade agreements for its close partners, such as Morocco (in contrast to the perceived “foot 
dragging” by the EU towards e.g.  Free Trade Agreements, such as with the UAE, NATO‟s attractiveness 
in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  and  its  inter-regional  “dynamics”,  such  as  the  waterways  bordering  the 
Arabian Peninsula, remains strong.  
  
Union for the Mediterranean 
 
Aliboni et al. (2006, 30) had reiterated scholars‟ and elites‟ calls a few years ago, especially on the 
southern Mediterranean, for institutional reform of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP), “based on their wish 
to  play  a  more  active  role  in  the  EMP”  (Ibid.).  The  new  beginning  in  terms  of  the  Union  for  the 
Mediterranean  (UfM)  to  this  regional  Euro-Mediterranean  cooperative  security  process  is  poised  to 
                                                            
    
3 in terms of: Home Missions (Deterrence and Defense -> lead role. Transatlantic Resilience and Europe Whole, Free and at 
Peace -> support/selective role; and Away Missions (Crisis Prevention -> lead/selective support role. Stability Operations -> 
support /selective lead role. Working Effectively with Partners -> Support/Ensemble Player) (Hamilton et al. 2009, 23) 
UN 
ESDP 
NATO/M
D/ICI 
Dialogue/I/
In 
UfM 
 
UfM 
UfM 
CFSP address these desires and needs, even though at the time of writing the new UfM permanent Secretariat in 
Barcelona per se is not fully functional yet (though extensive programs in all three areas, the political, 
economic,  and  social-cultural,  continue  through  the  European  Neighborhood  Program  (ENP)  and/or 
NGOs, most prominently the Anna Lindh Foundation).  
    Aliboni et al. (2006, 30) emphasize that a greater effort needs to be allocated to bridging the security 
“culture”-gap between the Northern Mediterranean countries, who emphasize a regional security concept, 
and  the  Southern Mediterranean countries,  where  the  “Arab  trans-state  community  concept” is  more 
natural, with the overall aim to “work towards a more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention” 
(Ibid.,  31),  encompassing  beyond  the  three  baskets  (economic,  political,  social)  also  a  “spiritual” 
dimension (Ibid.). Additionally, Aliboni et al. (2006, 31) suggest tackling a common security culture in 
the Euro-Mediterranean within a larger framework beyond party politics of only the EMP.  
   The  Union  for  the  Mediterranean  is  hoped  not  to  distract  from,  or  dilute  the  potential  cohesion, 
solidarity and concerted socio-political evolution between the EU and Arab countries by not adding more 
bureaucratic  layers  without  true  identification  with,  or  shared  values  and  visions,  beyond  Sarkozy‟s 
original fantasy of guaranteeing France, and French (especially energy) companies, a privileged position 
vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean, to the exclusion of other Southern European countries, and most 
certainly the EU‟s commitments overall. The involvement of the EU Commission in shaping that version 
into the UfM did not put into question Turkey‟s EU applicant status, and involved all EU members in toto 
(EurActiv.com 5/12/08). 
   The general goals of the UfM coincide, 
 even  in  terminology,  with  the  Barcelona  Declaration…[:]  if  the  goal  is  to 
achieve a region of shared peace, stability and prosperity, develop human potential, 
facilitate understanding among cultures and exchanges between societies, these are 
precisely  the  headings  of  the  different  sections  of  the  Barcelona  Declaration 
(Escribano and Lorca 2008, 23). 
 
Overall, Sarkozy expressed the hope during the UfM‟s launch as surmounting all the hatreds “[of the 
region] to make space for a great dream of peace and civilization” (Bennhold 2007,1), anchoring the 
regional  cooperation  in  energy  (e.g.  a  solar  energy  program),  security  (including  the  expanded fight 
against disasters), counter-terrorism and immigration within a trade agreement (including  the building of 
maritime and coastal land highways), an EU-Mediterranean university (2008) and the creation, at last, of 
a  Mediterranean  Investment  Bank  (MIB)  to  be  modeled  on  the  European  Investment  Bank  (Ibid.).           
Indeed, upon the launch of the UfM, French Foreign Minister Kouchner specified climate change, access 
to water and energy, migration, the environment and dialogue between civilizations as key areas for 
cooperation  (AP 7/13/08). While the last three key areas were in fact already also mentioned in the 
Barcelona Process of 1995, the first three represent an additional focus for the new UfM. These three, 
climate change, and access to water and energy, are in fact also some of the security sectors identified in 
this dissertation as common to the Euro-Mediterranean region, contributing to its identity as a (more 
multi-centric) Regional Security Complex. This also points to an enhanced Euro-Mediterranean Regional 
Security Complex within the UfM, which is enhanced by other authoritative speech acts, such as “The 
Mediterranean is a key to  our influence in the world. It‟s also a key for Islam that is torn between 
modernity and fundamentalism” (Sarkozy in a campaign speech in Toulon February 2008, quoted in Ibid., 
2). A senior Israeli diplomat (anonymous) stated that “[the UfM] gives us another opportunity to have a 
dialogue with countries that we sometimes have difficulties holding a dialogue with” (quoted in Ibid.). 
Again, these statements point to a deepening of the Euro-Med as security community, by integrating not 
only institutions, but also values (e.g. the major religions of the region), as well as a consciousness of its 
identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
     It is particularly interesting to note that some writers, such as Escribano and Lorca (2008, 21) have 
explicitly viewed the proposed Union for the Mediterranean as a “constructive approach” to progress 
beyond the EMP in building a true geopolitical space, involving i.a. all twenty-seven EU member states, 
as well as all MENA states that are currently EMP members, in a spirit of “deepening” the relations between  them  (Ibid.).  As  such,  the  UfM  should  be  considered  a  potentially  significant  institutional 
structure  to  assist  in  the  consolidation  addressing  security  challenges  in  the  Mediterranean  region 
internally, as well as in fortifying it to external or inter-regional threats, from a softpower position against 
NATO‟s  hardpower  backing  there,  such  as  through  NAVSOUTH,  CINCSOUTH  and  SACEUR 
(Germond and Grove 2010, 5).  
    In light of this, it would be foolish to belittle the UfM in favor of near-sighted and local interests, rather 
than maximize its potential to not only support regional stability, but in the end security for all its member 
states: this is not the time for fear of failure (Gonzalez 2010), but to rise above it to face tremendous 
challenges beyond the capabilities of sub-regions or even nation states. 
 
Intra- and interregional Emerging Hegemons 
 
The following sub-sections provide a very abbreviated sampling of the inter-regional political reordering 
pertaining to the Mediterranean: 
 
Iran 
 
Strenghtened by the weakening of their old adversaries, the now subdued Sunnis in Iraq (following the 
U.S. military presence)  in favor of the newly empowered Shia there, the approach of weapons-grade 
uranium production in Iran, and a strong mutual trading relationship with China, Iran is also adopting a 
new  approach  in  its  ties  to  Africa  (Isria  2010a).  Geostrategically,  this  could  be  interpreted  as  i.a. 
supportive of the extensive Chinese economic presence – perhaps lending teeth to an ally who seeks its 
economic rise “peacefully” (without blood on its own hands?).  In terms of potentially increased Iranian 
engagement  in  Africa,  the  significance  to  the  Euro-Mediterranean  might  be  in  terms  of  illegal 
immigration into the (southern) EU, as the Maghreb is frequently used as a transit point for immigrants 
from sub-Saharan Africa.  
    Furthermore, the Iranian “tangent” to the Euro-Mediterranean – and the U.S. presence there – is the 
Russian “component” in this very multi-level dynamic and its broad security implications (e.g. bringing 
Russia into the NATO and transatlantic “dialogue” anew in terms of the reduction of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe – vis-à-vis potential threats, such as from Iran, which it supplies at the same time with 
nuclear fuel). As Frost (2010,2) refers to Iran: “Great Powers Collide”. While some countries do not 
appear to be threatened by Iranian nuclear enrichment (whether due to geographic distance or a friendly 
relationship with it), such as Brazil and Turkey, who brokered an agreement with Iran earlier this spring 
to hold about half of Iran‟s enriched uranium (permitting it to keep enough to continue to enrich the 
remainder), after last year‟s US-EU-Russian agreement with Tehran was reneged on by the latter. While 
this  “showcases”  an  example  of  the  nascent  regional  security  dynamics  of  intra-  and  extra-regional 
emerging hegemons in the Mediterranean, existing actors in the effort to control Iran‟s enrichment efforts 
were a. not pleased, and b. perhaps admonished to strengthen the priority allocated to their cooperation, 
acting  under  UN  Security  Council  decisions,  as  well  as  beyond  them,  if  they  are  to  be  effective  in 
addressing the arms race anticipated by Iran‟s neighbors, who “are wary of falling behind on nuclear 
technology” (England 2010). 
 
Israel-Palestine 
 
In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict which is at the time of writing addressed anew in the current round 
of peace negotiations at the initiative of the U.S., with the continued support of the other partners of the 
Mideast Quartet as well as especially Egypt and Jordan. Without the U.S.‟ active and sustained influence, 
the security concerns inherent in the conflict (territory, refugees, etc.) might not have gained sufficient 
momentum to give the current efforts the necessary initiative. The EU‟s consistent efforts, both within the 
EMP and now the UfM/ENP initiatives have been consistently supporting security as well as economic 
and social empowerment programs for both parties, solidifying the basis for the actual resUfM peace talks now  on  a  basis  which  is  fair  to  all  parties.  This  means  compliance  with  international  law,  such  as 
“bringing  Israel‟s  Bomb  out  of  the  Basement”  (Cohen  and  Miller  2010),  so  that  evolving  nuclear 
strategies  by  its  neighbors  can  be  addressed  rationally,  rather  than  based  on  speculation  by  Israel‟s 
neighbors, contributing the anticipated regional nuclear arms race.  
 
Turkey 
 
Having voted positively on its new constitution in September 2010, Turkey‟s role to modernize itself, i.a. 
in preparation for its EU-accession, it has simultaneously broadened its foreign policy presence towards 
its southern and eastern neighbors recently. Its relationship with the U.S. has been traditionally very 
constructive, especially as a NATO member, despite its reservations over the U.S.‟ use of its airspace 
during the former‟s military action in Iraq. NATO‟s Istanbul Initiative(ICI), which  
“extends to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE … engages its partners on a 26+1 basis, 
and  equips  the  [Mediterranean  Dialogue]  MD  with  both  a  multilateral  and  a  bilateral 
dimension … [to promote] regional security and stability, better mutual understanding, and 
the dispelling of misperceptions among NATO and partner countries” (Schumacher 2010, 6). 
While the success of this transatlantic link is difficult to quantify, the demand for – and success of – 
NATO non-Article 5 missions in the greater Mediterranean inter-regional dynamics is unquestioned, even 
if NATO cannot guarantee each aligned country‟s every security need.   
    Turkey‟s relationship with the EU has been hindered by political, and some claim religious, insecurity 
on  the  part  of  the  EU,  despite  Turkey‟s  official  EU  candidacy  status.  Nevertheless,  Turkey  has 
confidently positioned itself as a very effective economic partner to, and skilled political mediator with,  
its neighbors around the Black Sea, as well as with Iran, Syria – and Greece (Allessandri 2010, 6; Evin et 
al.  2010,  14),  while  upholding  its  values towards its  old ally  Israel, i.e.  not succumbing  to  security 
blackmail by the latter (e.g. during the first “Gaza flotilla” in the spring of 2010), but supporting the 
Palestine-Israeli peace process.  
    Hence such a skilled regional and inter-regional foreign policy actor, who has overall consistently 
continued to support the security dilemmas of the West, needs to continue to be part of its hard and soft 
institutional dynamics to ensure its future role in them. While the Cyprus “dilemma” continues to be 
resolved, albeit in baby steps, irrational religious phobias used by politicians in the West for purely selfish 
gains should not hinder overall Mediterranean stability
4 and development – or Turkey‟s pivotal role in 
enhancing Europe‟s energy security/reducing European energy over-reliance on less reliable suppliers. 
The alternative might otherwise be a marginalization of Turkey to Europe‟s periphery politically and 
strategically, an option which the West may not be able to afford longterm in addressing the security of 
the  (greater)  Mediterranean  regional  dynamics  –  and  their  consequences  on  greater  European  and 
transatlantic stability as well. Rather, Turkey as an anchor in the greater inter-regional Mediterranean 
economic and political complexities cannot be overestimated – last but not least for the EU, for its part, 
not to lose its own influence in its southern neighborhood (Kirisci, Tocci and Walker 2010, 26). 
 
Syria 
   Syria, while still playing both to Russia, also aims to establish “best relations” with Iraq (ISRAI 2010b), 
while being wooed not only by its neighbor, Saudi Arabia
5, but also by the West, when Europeans and the 
U.S. decided to end Syria‟s international isolation, and facilitate its relationship with Iraq and Lebanon, 
affecting the latter‟s potential strength also in international organizations, such as the UfM, and, it is 
hoped, its support of Hezbollah (traditionally along with Iran). As this shifting tactical alliance may not 
signal Syria‟s break with Iran, its success remains to be confirmed in the inter-regional Mediterranean 
security constellation (Khalaf 2010; ISIRA 2010b).  
                                                            
    
4  Such as the Greek-Cypriotic veto of Turkey‟s participation in the European Defense Agency (Alessandri 2010, 11). 
    
5 which, after the Shiite-“empowerment” in Iraq, left Saudi Arabia little choice by to reach out to Sunni Syria (Schumacher 
2010, 18).  
Gulf States 
   The Gulf States (GCC), alarmed by the rise of Iran, continue to rely on NATO to protect their oil 
shipments and proximate security. At a time when non-U.S. NATO members plan drastic defense cuts
6, it 
would leave the U.S. to compensate for these to maintain i.a. the Gulf‟s security and oil shipments to the 
West  (as  well as its  energy  security)  and  to  Asia. This region reflects the  overlapping  regional  and 
transatlantic actors and strategies in the inter-regional Mediterranean dynamics between relying on the 
soft power of the EU in terms of their economic cooperation agreements (even if these often lag in 
ratification and implementation) (Schumacher 2010, 11), and relies on – and cooperates with
7 - the hard 
security, which is supported to a large extent by the U.S. 
 
Rational Actors: National Self Interest 
 
Securing regional unity and stability is the goal across the Northern Atlantic, be it pertaining to the U.S. 
national interest in terms of petroleum resources, to NATO in terms of its member states‟ security, the EU 
in terms of its southern neighborhood, and the Southern Mediterranean in terms of a bulwark amidst a   
pervasive sense of distrust and suspicion among their Southern neighbors. These south-south connections 
are one of the goals of the UfM to strengthen with certain programs incidentally, contrary to statements 
by some authors that the EU inhibits sub-regionalism (e.g. Smith 2006). Rather, globalization processes 
need  to  be  approached  beyond  systemic  theories  to  recognize  additionally  “the  diversity  of  social 
processes” (Oke 2009, 310, emphasis added). A short-term polarization within a U.S.-EU-Mediterranean 
security region for personal political goals is a cost-benefit calculation and luxury we cannot afford in the 
name of international law on humanity and the global order with its respect for national boundaries: in the 
end we pay for the maintenance of inequalities, as economists inform us, in that the propagation of a 
lower economic segment in a population leads to longterm threats to economic growth (Wade 2009) as 
well as socio-political stability. 
     Additionally, the compromises both the EU and the U.S. have made with cooperative leaders in the 
southern Mediterranean, even if they do not conform to the Western ideal of democracy, respect for 
international  law  and  universally  agreed  rights,  in  order  to  maintain  dialogue  with  “incentive 
conditionality”, often leads to surface results, but without deeper reforms taking place. It is this “niche,” 
which the UfM will address considerably once the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be removed as the 
modus operandi of its actual mission (Final Statement of the UfM Ministerial Summit, Marseille 3-4 
November 2008). 
     In this trans-Atlantic environment of innovations i.a. in the security and foreign policy areas (such as 
an anticipated soft-balancing of power), it is essential that this opportunity for the EU-U.S. security 
dialogue
8  (Shapiro and Witney 2009) is maximized, not squandered to achieve not  only continued 
prosperity and stability within it (an area encompassing approximately 500 million Europeans
9, 308 
million  U.S.  and  almost  34  million  Canadian  citizens),  but  also  in  the  greater  trans -Atlantic 
neighborhood. While many expected to enjoy the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, stability 
and prosperity continue not to be guaranteed in this greater trans-Atlantic security complex (compare 
Boening 2008b). In fact, many threats can only be solved jointly, such as energy security (both sourcing 
                                                            
    
6 The UK is proposing 10-20 percent defense cuts, and Germany aims to reduce its army by thirty percent (Domby and Luce 
2010). 
    
7 As exemplified by the attendance of all GCC states (with the exception of Kuw ait) at the 2007 Annapolis conference, 
together with Israel (Schumacher 2010,15), and the Saudi -Qatari Peace Initiative, presented at the Arab League‟s 2002 Beirut, 
and re-endorsed in 2007 by Jordanian King Abdullah (Ibid., 16).  
    
8 Incorporating  i.a. multilateral security aspects, such as a follow up on our Pittsburgh Summit commitment to implement the 
G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth  
    
9 With several candidate countries on track to join, potentially enlarging the EU‟s area and population substantially. This 
enlargement process per se encompasses a dynamic which in itself, which, if not carried out effectively, could destabilize the EU 
and loose its leverage, as might become the case with Turkey‟s EU candidacy, which might turn east to build its influence in the 
Middle East, if  its candidacy continues to be sabotaged by some EU members (Stephens 10/23/2009). and  shipments),  management  of  Iranian  and  North  Korean  nuclear  proliferation,  environmental 
degradation, or food and water security for millions, especially when other potential multilateral partners‟ 
security  dilemmas  do  not  enable  their  cooperation  (compare  Blitz  and  Bozorgmehr  2009;  and  Buck 
2009).  
    In  conclusion,  contrary  to  declarations  of  the  demise  of  post-modern  security,  the  current  time 
represents just the very beginning of it pertaining to the greater Euro-Mediterranean region. That means 
that not just national governments have a voice, but socio-economic interest need to be recognized, not 
only of the haves, but also those whose voice needs to be heard. This may mean access of southern 
Mediterranean  farmers  to  northern  Mediterranean  markets,  and  some  type  of  positive  inclusion  of 
Islamists (Kausch and Youngs 2009, 974). To quote Otte (2009, 1-2): “The new U.S. commitment is 
improving the odds on a genuinely sustained and comprehensive conflict resolution effort that could 
change realities in the region. This new approach should be parallel [to other initiatives, such as the UfM], 
rather than sequential, thus creating mutually reinforcing processes” to create regional stability, rather 
than have it be taken hostage to Western interest in oil and gas (Spencer 2009, 2) – as the nature of 
“positive  sum”  would  indicate  that  a  stable  southern  Mediterranean  is  more  beneficial  to  just  these 
interests than the achievement of zero sum goals. Finally, an expansion of a transatlantic “regionalism”- 
and convergence of practices and complementary interests (rather than the hostile suspicion of previous 
administrations) might serve these old friends well in the future in light of those further away who have 
arrived in the Mediterranean, and the seas it connects to, and with whom the relationship is less tested or 
tried by heritage and tradition. The transatlantic relationship cannot be taken for granted, but should be 
optimized by rational calculation and effort, rather than just be tolerated as inevitable, as a manner of 
strategic concept to express a Grand Strategy, rather than a strategy of limited aim (Sanfelice 2009a).  
    
 
Conclusions 
 
On occasion the EU is perceived as a “payor, not as a player,” an entity perceived outside its member 
states  as  having  its  actions  limited  by  an  “expectations-capability  gap”  (Farrell  2006,  30).  This 
shortcoming is hoped to be remedied by the new External Action Service, enabling the EU to speak with 
one voice, and as a power (i.e. a strategic actor) which is able to actively pursue longterm objectives and 
acquire the necessary means to do so (Biscop 2009, 3). 
    The EU‟s modus operandi has been its softpower to persuade external actor to see, and sometimes 
adopt, its values and norms. The “EU as a power” was not mentioned in the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), although the Laeken Declaration (December 15, 2001, quoted in Biscop 2009, 20), refers to the 
EU as “a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism” (Ibid.) without 
turning a blind eye against the world‟s heartrending injustices. However, if the EU wants the cynics, 
nationalists, or radicals to be persuaded, it needs to be more than a market, but also a strategic actor 
(Biscop 2009, 20).  
    While prevention is the first choice to achieve economic, political and regional security, the leverage of 
conditionality is limited, especially in relation to other regional organizations and global powers, due to 
the scale of its interdependence with them (Ibid.). But not only in terms of relations with state actors does 
the EU seek to influence political or economics, but also in terms of its partners, such as the U.S., should 
the EU continue to enhance a cooperative, rather than the morally superior position displayed on occasion 
in response to perceived U.S strength to maximize the effectiveness of a “joint transatlantic position” 
towards common threats, beyond the “traditional” (such as threats to ideology of democracy and open 
markets, fight against poverty, hunger, disease, and regional destabilizing actors using weapons of mass 
destruction and piracy and narcotics) also  newly emerging threats from non-traditional sources, such as 
weapons smuggling to the West Bank on a large scale from Miami, or illegal supplies of electronic parts 
for explosives (which could be used to target American soldiers in Iraq) to Iran via South Florida (Weaver 
2010), to maximize the fight contra these against the background of historical shared transatlantic security 
challenges, such as the Arab-Israeli peace process.     In terms of hard security, the ESS fosters a strategic culture of early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention in a context of the UN Security Council as the primary organization responsible for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, with the use of force as a last resort at times of threat. 
Howorth (2010) argues specifically in favor of greater integration in security and defense by EU member 
states and to overcome national “inhibitions” during a climate of “inward looking re-nationalization.”  
NATO enlargement would be part of the EU‟s grand security strategy, although, as the EU‟s success 
during  the  Georgia  crisis  of  2008  has  shown,  its  softpower  approach  with  Russia  continues  to  be 
successful on certain occasions. Europe‟s new narrative for its new defense and security strategy needs to 
be more unified – and internally and transatlantically more coordinated and cooperative - to face global- 
scale threats when the micro national perspective will not suffice any longer to address these successfully 
to enable the nation states of the transatlantic alliance to survive in the future at the level they strive for. 
This should include encouragement of sub-regional integration efforts, such as energy integration in the 
western Mediterranean, but discourage these subregional groupings which at the same time attempt to 
sabotage the stability of tried and true alliances for their local benefit only. 
   The U.S. under President Obama, while encouraging multilateralism in its foreign policy, continues a 
proactive grand security strategy, be it the new START agreement with Russia, its initiative – and major 
support - of NATO and its future (including cyber security), or the U.S.‟ National Space Policy of 2010, 
to name a few of particular relevance in the Mediterranean. 
   The upcoming US-EU Lisbon summit, in conjunction with the NATO summit and its launch of its new 
“2020”-strategy,  are  hoped  to  be  an  affirmation  of  the  transatlantic  partnership  in  addressing 
Mediterranean  regional  and  inter-regional  (such  as  with  Arab  states)    traditional  and  non-traditional 
historical and evolving security challenges – and to expand the untapped potential of this relationship 
(Dombey 2010). 
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